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RUNNING HEAD: Comparing to the ingroup versus the outgroup
Abstract
Previous work studying social comparisons suggests that people are likely to assimilate to
ingroup members (e.g., Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007), but can also contrast from ingroup
members if outgroup members are present (Blanton, Miller, & Dye, 2002). The present research
built upon these findings by including a no-comparison control group to test for true contrast and
assimilation effects. Across two studies, women primed with a gender-math stereotype
received false feedback about their performance on a math task; and in some conditions, they
learned of the performance of ostensible male and/or female co-participants. Relative to a nocomparison control, we did not see evidence of ingroup assimilation in either study. However, in
both studies, we found that participants were likely to contrast their self-evaluations away from
downward targets, regardless of group membership. This suggests that self-enhancement
motivations may be stronger than the drive for ingroup assimilation.

Keywords: social comparison, assimilation, contrast, stereotype threat, control groups
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People often rely on social comparison information when evaluating their own abilities or
characteristics (Festinger, 1954; Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). Much comparison research
simply examines how people respond to comparison information from better off or worse off
others. However, there has been very little research examining how people use social comparison
information specifically when experiencing stereotype threat; a search of the literature yields
only 15 publications that discuss both fields, and even fewer that examine how threat influences
the effects of comparison. This gap in the social comparison literature could have important
implications for understanding how stereotype threat can affect people in real world settings. For
example, if a woman learns about her performance on a math task, the comparison information
might have a different effect depending on whether it comes from another woman or a man,
especially if the negative stereotype about women’s math abilities is emphasized. If certain
comparisons improved her feelings about her math ability, this could buffer against future
threats; however, if a comparison resulted in feeling even worse about math ability, threat effects
could be compounded for future tasks. Additionally, studying the effects of social comparison in
a stereotype threat setting can offer insights as to how both processes influence selfevaluations. Research suggests that comparisons with ingroup and outgroup members can yield
different outcomes (e.g., Hall & Crisp, 2008), especially when group membership is important
for the domain. As such, the present research seeks to understand how people socially compare
with ingroup versus outgroup members, specifically in situations when negative stereotypes
about the group are made salient.
Comparisons Under Threat
Much research has focused on how people use social comparison information when
experiencing ego threat in general; a large body of work points to the idea that when
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experiencing threat, people are more likely to seek out downward comparison targets (Friend &
Gilbert, 1973; Hakmiller, 1966; Vohs & Heatherton, 2004; Wills, 1981), and to use comparison
information to form more favorable self-evaluations (e.g., Beer, Chester, & Hughes, 2013;
Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). Overall, this work demonstrates that many kinds of threat
lead to people using social comparison in self-enhancing ways. However, there is less known
about how people compare when they are threatened by their own social identity.
Stereotype Threat. Stereotype threat effects occur when members of a stigmatized group
are faced with a stereotype-relevant task (e.g., Steele, 1997); despite efforts to perform well,
people experiencing stereotype threat often confirm the stereotype. For example, when women
were told that gender differences were expected on a math test (versus that there were no gender
differences on the particular test), they performed worse on the task (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn,
1999). Stereotype threat effects have been found for African Americans and Latino students and
academics (Brown & Lee, 2005), elderly adults and reaction time (Lambert et al., 2016), and
white students and performance on a race-based implicit association test (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett,
Ray, & Hart, 2004). Importantly for this work, there is also ample evidence of stereotype threat
affecting women’s performance in cognitive and physical domains as widespread as visuospatial
assignments (Campbell & Collaer, 2009), math ability tests, (Tomasetto, Alparone, & Cadinu,
2011), specific athletic tasks (Hively & El-Alayli, 2014), and financial decision making (Carr &
Steele, 2010). In addition to affecting performance on stereotype relevant tasks, stereotype threat
also leads to disengagement from stereotyped tasks or domains (e.g., Steele, 1997), decreased
practice or self-handicapping (e.g., Stone, 2002), or decreased identification with the stereotyped
group (e.g., Cohen & Garcia, 2008).
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Stereotype threat and social comparison. Relatively little work has focused on how
stereotype threat and social comparison can intersect. Some research suggests that comparison
targets can actually induce stereotype threat. Hall and Crisp (2008) demonstrated that women
(who strongly identified with their gender) performed worse on a math test after being primed
with men by writing an essay about things men typically do. However, women who were lowidentifiers with their gender performed better after being primed with the concept of men. In
other words, they contrasted away from their group prime.
Marx, Stapel, and Muller (2005) demonstrated that women experiencing stereotype threat
performed better on a math test after comparing to a woman who was described as very good at
math and likely to pursue a quantitative graduate degree than after comparing to a woman who
was described as bad at math and likely to pursue a career in acting. In other words, comparing
to an ingroup member who defied the stereotype helped buffer against the typical stereotype
threat effects.
There is also evidence that social comparison can influence self-evaluations when
experiencing a social identity threat. Redersdorff and Martinot (2009) studied psychology majors
whose majors were framed as either high status (in comparison to philosophy majors) or low
status (in comparison to pre-med majors). When their ingroup was described as being low in
status (but not high), participants felt better about themselves if an ingroup member
outperformed them. In other words, when part of a lower status (i.e. “stigmatized”) group,
participants assimilated their self-evaluations to upward ingroup targets. Related research
(Mackie, 1984) suggests that when an ethnic group identity is described as low status, children
are more likely to report that their ingroup members are better-off, whereas that their outgroup
members are worse-off than they are.
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In a study that tested stereotype threat more specifically, Blanton, Crocker, and Miller
(2000) had African American women complete a difficult “IQ” measure of “natural math ability”
with either another African American woman or a white woman (both of whom were
confederates). Participants learned that they scored in the 67th percentile and then found out
from overhearing the experimenter that their ostensible co-participant had scored either in the
20th percentile or the 99th percentile before rating their performance self-esteem. They argued
that participants assimilated to ingroup members and contrasted from outgroup members. More
specifically, when they were comparing to another African American woman (i.e., an ingroup
member), they felt better about themselves when they were outperformed. However, when they
were comparing to a white woman (i.e., an outgroup member), participants felt worse about
themselves when they were outperformed than when they had performed better than the coparticipant. Overall, evidence from these three studies suggests that stereotype or social identity
threat is likely to lead to ingroup assimilation and outgroup contrast.
In a conceptually related study, Blanton, Christie, and Dye (2002) tested how women felt
after comparing to both ingroup members (another woman) or outgroup members (a man). In
this study, women completed a math and spatial abilities task and then found out that she had
earned a score of 67 out of 100 and that her co-participants had earned a 99 and a 35 out of 100.
It was manipulated whether it was the ingroup member who was performing better or worse than
the participant. They also manipulated stereotype salience; in the low salience condition,
participants were told that most college students could solve the math problems regardless of
their training, and in the high salience condition, the experimenter suggested that men might
perform better on the task. When the stereotype salience was low, participants felt better about
their own performance when their ingroup co-participant had performed better (i.e., when both
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the participant and the woman co-participant had done better than the man); however, when the
stereotype salience was high participants felt better about their own performance when they had
outperformed their ingroup co-participant. The authors refer to this as a kind of shifting
standards-- when a stereotype about gender and math ability was made salient, the male target
might have become irrelevant, so the women only compared (i.e., contrasted) to the other
woman’s score. In a second study, they demonstrated that stereotype endorsement moderated
how social comparison information was used under threat; women who endorsed the stereotype
that men are better at math than women were more likely to “shift standards” and evaluate the
self more favorable when outperforming another woman, whereas women who did not endorse
this stereotype felt better about themselves when they and another women outperformed a man.
While other studies have demonstrated assimilation to ingroup members when
experiencing stereotype threat, the results of Blanton et al. (2002) suggest that contrast from
ingroup members might be likely under certain situations; particularly situations in which
stereotype salience and endorsement are high. So why these differences? Blanton (2001) offers
an explanation that gender may be unique in terms of its effects on group-experience, and
therefore on social comparison processes; for example, Blanton argues that in a person-to-person
interaction, gender is not as distinct of a feature as something like race or ethnicity so it might
not even activate a social identity. However, the research described above by Marx and
colleagues (2005) and Hall and Crisp (2008) suggests that gender can be a “grouping” factor
when gender stereotypes are made more salient, and that women are likely to assimilate to
ingroup primes in these situations. Additionally, work by Ledgerwood and Chaiken (2007)
suggests that people are more likely to assimilate to ingroup primes when the ingroup is broad
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versus narrow. As such, it does seem possible that gender would be considered a relevant and
distinct grouping variable, especially when a negative gender stereotype is made salient.
The goal of the present work is to test how women compare to ingroup members when
outgroup members are absent versus present. Based on work described above, we would predict
that when comparing only to ingroup members (i.e., other women), women should assimilate
their self-evaluations to their comparison targets; however, when women are comparing to both
ingroup and outgroup members, we would predict that women would “shift standards” (as seen
in Blanton et al., 2002) and contrast away from their ingroup members. Ledgerwood and
Chaiken (2007) demonstrated that primes result in assimilation when they are providing context,
but contrast when providing a distinct point of comparison. For gender, we argue that the
presence of ingroup members only might provide “context”, but the presence of an outgroup
member could shift the focus of the ingroup member to become a distinct point of comparison or
even competition.
True Contrast and Assimilation? An additional alternative explanation for the findings
discussed above is that results were misinterpreted as being assimilation and contrast. Recent
work (Bruchmann, 2017) demonstrates that without a no-comparison control group, it is
impossible to make claims of true assimilation or contrast. It is possible that one or more of the
conditions in these studies would not be different from a baseline self-evaluation. Perhaps, given
the tendency to self-enhance when experiencing threat, people would be more likely to contrast
away from downward targets than upward and more likely to assimilate to upward targets than
downward-- regardless of group membership. Including a no-comparison control condition
would further the understanding of how comparison information is used when in situations
where stereotypes are activated.
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The Present Research
The present study tests how women compare to ingroup and outgroup members both
independently and together. After being primed with gender stereotypes, female participants
completed a math test and learned they earned a mid-range score (in the control condition, this is
all they learned). Some participants also learned that they had performed better or worse than a
female or male co-participant-- in other words, they compared only to an ingroup or an outgroup
member who had done better or worse. In these conditions, based on the prior work suggesting
ingroup assimilation and outgroup contrast, we expected that participants’ self-evaluations be
more positive when they were outperformed by ingroup members or had outperformed an
outgroup member, and less positive when they were outperformed by outgroup members or had
outperformed an ingroup member. However, by including no-comparison control group, we will
be able to determine whether assimilation and contrast is happening in both directions. In other
conditions, participants learned that their performance was directly in between a female and a
male co-participants’; that is, participants compared to both ingroup and outgroup members. In
these conditions, we expected that participants would have more positive self-evaluations when
performing better than their ingroup member than when performing worse than ingroup
members. If the presence of an outgroup member makes people more likely to contrast away
from ingroup members (the idea of “shifting standards”), then we would predict that people
evaluate themselves more positively (than control) when they outperform an ingroup member
when an outgroup member is present, and less positively (than control) when an outgroup
member is absent.
Experiment 1
Method
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Participants and Design. Female undergraduate students (N=163, 42.5% non-white,
M = 18.84 years, SD =.95 years) participated in exchange for partial course credit. Participants
age

age

were either at the lab session alone, or were with another female co-participant, a male
confederate, or both. Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions where they
compared themselves to no one (control), a female who performed better (female upward) or
worse (female downward), a male who performed better (male upward) or worse (male
downward), both a female who performed better and a male who performed worse (female
upward and male downward), or both a male who performed better and a female who performed
worse (male upward and female downward).
Materials and Procedure. Participants were informed by a female experimenter that
they would be helping to standardize a new type of math test known as modular arithmetic for a
college sample (cover story adapted from Van Loo, Boucher, Rydell, & Rydell, 2013). To induce
stereotype threat, the experimenter went on to explain that preliminary research has suggested
that modular arithmetic problems provided a better assessments of “natural math ability” than
other math tests, but that the data typically demonstrate a gender difference “such that men
typically perform better than women” and that the present study was aiming to learn more about
the reason behind this gender difference (manipulation adapted from Beilock et al., 2007, &
Blanton et al., 2000).
Modular Arithmetic Exam. Participants began the study by learning how to complete
modular arithmetic (MA). MA equations take the form of a≡b (mod c) and are solved by
subtracting b from a and then dividing by c. If the resulting answer is an integer, the answer is
“true”, and if it is not an integer, the answer is “false”. After learning the process and going
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through two practice items, participants completed 50 MA items (adapted from Beilock et al.,
2007, and Van Loo et al., 2013).
Social Comparison Feedback. When participants had all completed the MA exam, the
experimenter told them that she would be retrieving their score reports from a printer in the next
room; upon returning, she passed out a score report to each present participant with their own
score highlighted. In reality, the score-reports were all pre-printed and a bogus score of 81%
correct was highlighted. In the control condition, this is the only information that was indicated
on the score report. In the experimental conditions, participants could also see the (bogus) scores
and gender of any other participants. The co-participants’ scores were either upward
comparisons (98%), downward comparisons (64%), or both upward and downward comparisons
in the conditions where two others were present. See Table 1 for complete score report
information across conditions for both studies.
Dependent Measures. Next, on pencil and paper, participants completed the dependent
measures. First, they indicated how they would rate their performance, and how satisfied they
were with their performance on the MA task (1= extremely poor/dissatisfied, 7= extremely
good/satisfied). Participants also indicated how they would rate their ability on modular
arithmetic, and on math in general (1= extremely poor, 7= extremely good).
State Self-Esteem. Participants next completed the 7-item performance subscale from the
State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991); participants indicated their agreement with
items including “I feel confident about my abilities” and “I feel as smart as others” (1= not at all,
5= extremely).
Perceptions of Modular Arithmetic. Next, participants rated how much they liked
modular arithmetic as a way to measure math ability (1= dislike very much, 5= like very much),
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and how much they liked modular arithmetic compared to other math problems (1= strongly
prefer modular arithmetic, 5= strongly prefer standard math). Finally, participants were probed
for suspicion, and were debriefed.
Results
Modular Arithmetic Performance. The modular arithmetic items were scored and
accuracy was calculated dividing the total score by 50 (the total number of items). On average,
participants answered 85.51% (SD=15%) of the items correctly (significantly higher than the
bogus feedback of 81%, t(163)= 3.95, p<.001). Accuracy was marginally different across
comparison conditions, F(6, 156)= 1.86, p=.092, η =.067, however posthoc comparisons (with
2

p

Bonferroni corrections) did not reveal differences between conditions. We included MA
accuracy as a covariate in all other analyses and the patterns were not different, so differences in
accuracy will not be discussed further.
Self Evaluations. See Table 2 for means and standard deviations for Study 1 dependent
measures. We first calculated a score performance self-esteem subscale from the SSES
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; α=.79) and conducted an ANOVA. No significant effect of
condition emerged, F(6, 154)= 1.42, p=.211, η =.052.
2

p

As a secondary test, we averaged participants’ ratings of their performance, satisfaction,
and MA ability to create a self-evaluation composite (α= .76). An ANOVA revealed a main
effect of comparison condition on self-evaluations, F(6, 155)= 3.75, p=.002, η = .127. Planned
p

2

comparisons were conducted to test for the specific a priori predictions described above.
Did women assimilate to other women? No, we did not see evidence of assimilation.
Participants who compared to an ingroup upward target (M=3.94, SD= .85) rated themselves less
favorably than the baseline control (M=4.49, SD= .76; p=.011, d= -.68). Additionally, when
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compared to the no-comparison control, participants rated themselves marginally more favorably
when they had an ingroup downward target (M=4.86, SD= .55,p=.086, d= .56). In other words,
instead of finding assimilation to ingroup members like predicted, we saw distinct patterns of
contrast from ingroup members. Participants rated themselves as being different from coparticipants who were also women. Even if we did not include a baseline control group, we
would not have seen what looked like patterns of assimilation: participants comparing to only a
female co-participant provided less favorable self-evaluations when comparing to an upward
comparison target than when comparing to a downward comparison target (p<.001, d= -1.29).
Did women contrast from men? No. Participants who compared only to male
confederates did not rate themselves differently from the control (ps=.349 & .107, ds= -.64 &
.30) whether it was downward comparison information (M=4.87, SD= .63) or upward
comparison information (M=4.28, SD= .84). In other words, finding out that they had performed
better or worse than an outgroup member did not yield different self-evaluations than finding out
no social comparison information at all. Had we not included our control group, we would have
observed a pattern that might have looked like contrast; participants comparing to just a male
confederate rated themselves more favorably when they had downward comparison
information than upward p=.023, d= .79).
Did women “shift standards” when they compared to women and men? No.
Participants rated themselves similarly when they had both ingroup and outgroup comparisons
whether it was the female co-participant who had performed better (M=4.41, SD= .98) or the
male confederate who had performed better (M= 4.47, SD= .75, p= .805, d= -.07). Additionally,
participants did not rate themselves differently from control when they had both ingroup and
outgroup comparisons, regardless of the comparison direction (p’s= .699 & .909, ds= .10 & .03).
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Does comparison information from a man change how comparison information from a
woman is used? Maybe, but not in the predicted direction. The bidirectional comparison
conditions did appear to dampen any effects of the unidirectional comparison conditions. When
participants compared to both an upward female target and downward male target, they rated
themselves more favorably than when they compared only to an upward female target (p=.038,
d= .51). In other words, outperforming an outgroup member seemed to buffer against the effects
of underperforming compared to an ingroup member. When participants compared to both an
upward male target and a downward female target, they rated themselves marginally less
favorably (p=.092, d= -.59) than when comparing just to a downward female target; in this case,
underperforming an outgroup member seemed to take away the benefit of outperforming an
ingroup member.
Perceptions of Modular Arithmetic. Participants’ general rating of MA and their rating
of MA compared to standard math were averaged to create a composite (α=.71) in which higher
scores indicate a more favorable perception of MA. A significant main effect of comparison
condition emerged, F(6, 155)= 2.65, p=.018, η =.093. Post hoc analyses (using Bonferroni
2

p

corrections) suggested that participants who had outperformed a female co-participant (M=3.19,
SD= 1.02) had more positive perceptions of the modular arithmetic task than participants who
had been outperformed by a male confederate (M=2.16, SD= 0.82, p=.011, d= 1.11). Significant
differences between the other conditions did not emerge.
Discussion
Overall, our results did not support our predictions that participants would assimilate to
ingroup members unless an outgroup member was present. Instead, we saw evidence of contrast
effects; specifically, participants felt marginally better when they outperformed an ingroup
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member, and felt worse about their own performance (versus the control) when outperformed by
an ingroup member. This finding is inconsistent with previous research that has demonstrated
assimilation to ingroup members (Blanton et al., 2000; Hall & Crisp, 2008; Ledgerwood &
Chaiken, 2007; Redersdorf & Martinot, 2009), and is inconsistent with a pattern of selfenhancement in which people might be more likely to assimilate to upward targets and contrast
from downward. One potential explanation for our different results was our population. For
example, Blanton et al. (2000) studied African American women who were comparing to other
African American women or white women when they found patterns of ingroup assimilation. As
suggested by Blanton (2001), race might function differently from gender as a cue of similarity
that could lead to assimilation or contrast. However, other research suggests that gender should
be experienced in the same way as any other grouping variable (e.g., Hall & Crisp, 2008; Marx
et al., 2005; Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007).
Additionally, we saw only weak evidence that people contrast from outgroup members.
Participants rated themselves more favorably when they outperformed a male co-participant
(versus control), but did not rate themselves less favorably (versus control) when outperformed
by a male co-participant. This, again, is inconsistent with previous research that suggests we are
more likely to contrast away from outgroup members (Blanton et al., 2000; Hall & Crisp, 2008;
Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007; Redersdorf & Martinot, 2009). Although, this pattern is
consistent with self-enhancement in that participants did not report feeling worse than a baseline
control when comparing with better-or-worse-off outgroup members. One potential explanation
for our pattern of results was that we used a no-comparison control group. If the present study
had not included this control group, we would see patterns that seem to resemble contrast effects
when comparing to outgroup members; performing better than a man led to more favorable self-
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evaluations than performing worse than a man. However, the inclusion of the no-comparison
control group demonstrates that only comparing to a worse-off target led to contrast effects, and
that comparing to a better off target did not negatively affect self-evaluations. Given this
difference between our study and the others described, it is possible that the original studies were
misinterpreted.
Finally, we did not see evidence that comparing to both ingroup and outgroup members
changed the way ingroup comparison information was used. We hypothesized that the presence
of an outgroup member would lead people to contrast away from their ingroup members,
whether through a process of competition or because they provided a more relevant point of
comparison. However, self-evaluations in the conditions where both ingroup and outgroup
members were not different from each other or baseline control group. Beyond this, when
comparing the bidirectional and unidirectional conditions, we saw evidence that the outgroup
member was the comparison target that mattered more than the ingroup member and not the
other way around; for example, performing better than a male co-participant and worse than a
female co-participant led to more favorable self-evaluations than just performing worse than a
female co-participant. This pattern of results is the opposite of what we would have predicted
based on prior research by Blanton et al. (2002) that suggested that when stereotype salience or
endorsement was high, women “shifted standards” to contrast with other women when
comparison information with men was also present.
One potential issue with our study was that we did not measure whether our participants
were aware of or endorsed the stereotype that women are bad at math. This is an issue because if
our participants were not aware of the stereotype, our stereotype threat manipulation might not
have been effective, and gender might not have been a salient enough feature to lead to
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assimilation effects. Additionally, Blanton et al. (2002) demonstrated that shifting standards was
more likely for women who endorsed this stereotype. Considering that women who were told
they were outperformed by men had more negative attitudes about the modular arithmetic task
than women who thought they had outperformed another woman, it is possible that in general
our participants did not endorse the stereotype that men are better at math.
Study 2
Overview
The purpose of Study 2 was to provide an additional test of whether women would
assimilate to ingroup comparison information and contrast from outgroup situation when a
gender stereotype was made salient. In Study 2, we adjusted our comparison information so that
it was given in the form of percentiles and not just raw scores. The use of university-wide
percentile feedback information rather than percentage score feedback from a present coparticipant allowed for a standardization of all conditions so that only one participant was
involved in the experiment at a time. Additionally, we hoped that the percentile information
would make the comparison feedback more ambiguous which should allow for assimilation.
Additionally, to make stereotype threat more salient, all experimenters in Study 2 were
male. Keller and Sekequaptewa (2008) demonstrated that threat can be induced for women if
they are the only women in the room; as such, having a male experimenter should have induced
threat for all participants, whereas in Study 1, participants were never the only woman in the
room. We also altered several items on the MA task from Study 1 that were answered correctly
by most participants in order to make them more difficult, and in order to make the task more
threatening. Finally, we included measures of ingroup identification and stereotype endorsement
as potential moderators of the social comparison effects.
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Method
Participants and Design. Female undergraduate students (N=86, 52.2% non-white, M =
age

18.78 years, SD = 0.94 years) participated in exchange for partial course credit. Participants
age

arrived at the session alone, were greeted by a male experimenter and were randomly assigned to
one of five comparison conditions: control, female upward, female downward, male upward,
male downward.
Materials and Procedure. Study 2 followed the same procedures as Study 1 except for
the following changes.
Modular Arithmetic Exam. Participants learned how to complete MA items through the
same instructions as Study 1. The only difference between the MA exam for Study 2 was that 12
of the 50 items were altered to increase their difficulty.
Social Comparison Feedback. When participants had completed the MA exam on the
computer, they read that they would be shown percentile infographics displaying how their
performance compared to their university’s female and male student populations; they read that
they should pay careful attention to this information because they would be asked questions
about it.
On the next screen, the infographic was pre-generated with bogus percentile feedback
information. Participants always learned that they scored 81% correct on the MA task (as in
Study 1); depending on condition, they also learned that they were in the 53rd or 91st percentile
for males or females at their university. While two boxes always appeared as if two infographics
(one for male and one for female) would be displayed, one of the boxes would be grayed out as if
the image could not load on the computer (See Figure 1); in other words, participants received
only male or female percentile feedback information to compare to, never both. In the control
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condition, it appeared as if neither image could load and they received no comparison
information. If the participant brought the image “issue” to the attention of the experimenter, the
experimenter responded as if it was an accident and say, “Oh that’s strange. You are supposed to
get information about the breakdown for both males and females. I guess just keep going and I’ll
make sure the principal researcher knows about this.”
Dependent Measures.
Self-evaluations. Following the infographic display, participants completed selfevaluations on the computer. As in Study 1, they rated their MA performance, satisfaction with
their performance on the MA task, and general MA ability (1= extremely poor/dissatisfied, 7=
extremely good/satisfied). Furthermore, they rated their general math ability in comparison to
female and male students at their university, and in general (1= much worse, 7= much better).
Participants also completed the 7-item performance self-esteem measure from Study 1
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
Stereotype endorsement. Participants indicated whether they were aware of any
stereotypes about gender and math (yes or no), and how much they agree with the statement that
“women are worse at math than men” (1= completely disagree, 7 = completely agree).
Participants also indicated how important their gender and math ability were to their identity (1=
extremely unimportant, 7= extremely important). Finally, participants were asked to recall their
score and percentile information, were probed for suspicion, and were debriefed.
Results & Discussion
Manipulation Check. All but six participants accurately recalled their score on the
modular arithmetic task. The six participants who mis-remembered instead recalled their
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percentile information and indicated that they scored either 53% or 91%. Removing these
participants from the data set did not change the results of the study, so they were left in.
MA Accuracy. Despite attempts to make the modular arithmetic task more difficult in
the second study, participants actually performed better on it than they did in the first study. On
average, participants answered 88.18% of the items correctly (SD= 11.81%); accuracy did not
differ across conditions, F<1.
Self Evaluations. As in Study 1, we calculated a score on the performance self-esteem
measure (α= .81); however, there was no evidence of an effect of the comparison manipulation
on state self esteem, F<1. Again, we averaged participants’ ratings of their performance,
satisfaction, and MA ability to create a self-evaluation composite (α= .87). An ANOVA revealed
a significant effect of comparison condition on self-evaluations, F(4, 81)= 10.66, p<.001, η =
2

p

.345. Specific planned comparisons were conducted based on our a priori research questions. See
Table 3.
Did women assimilate to other women? No, as in Study 1, we did not see evidence of
assimilation. Participants with downward female comparison information (M=5.26, SD= 1.32)
rated themselves more favorably than the control (M= 3.80, SD= 1.09, p<.001, d= 1.21) but
participants with upward female comparison information (M=4.20, SD= 1.01) did not rate
themselves differently from the control group (p=.291, d= .38). In other words, we do not see
symmetrical contrast effects; instead, we see that people are more likely to contrast away from
downward comparison information than upward.
Did women contrast from men? Yes, but only when they outperformed their outgroup
members. Participants with only male percentile information rated themselves more favorably
when they had downward comparison information (M= 5.73, SD= .77) than if they did not have
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comparison information (p<.001, d= 2.05). Participants who had male upward comparison
information (M= 3.98, SD= 1.10) did not rate themselves differently from control (p=.634,
d=.16). As with the participants with female percentile information, only the downward
comparison condition was different from control.
Whether participants were comparing with the ingroup or the outgroup, we see patterns
of self-enhancement. Overall, relative to control, participants rated themselves no differently
after comparing to upward targets, but more favorably after comparing to downward targets.
Did stereotype awareness or endorsement moderate these effects? No. While 73.3% of
participants indicated that they were aware of a stereotype about gender and math, there was not
a significant stereotype awareness x comparison condition interaction, F(4, 75)=1.05, p=.390,
η =.053. Additionally, stereotype endorsement did not moderate the effects on self-evaluations,
2

p

F(15,62)= 1.48, p=.14, η = .264. However, this could be due to a floor effect; 41.9% of
p

2

participants indicated that they “completely disagreed” with the stereotype that women are worse
at math than men. Only 7% of participants indicated any endorsement (“slightly agree”) of the
stereotype.
As a secondary test, we examined whether being a STEM major moderated the
comparison effects on self-evaluations; there is evidence that women who are more strongly
identified with math experience stronger threat effects (e.g., Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). Again,
there was no evidence of either a main effect of being a STEM major, or a STEM major x
comparison condition interaction, Fs<1.
Relative Math Ability. We did not find evidence of an effect of comparison condition on
participants’ ratings of their math ability compared to their typical female classmate, or to the
typical man or woman in general (Fs<1). However, an ANOVA did reveal a main effect of
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comparison condition on participants’ ratings of their math ability compared to their typical male
classmate, F(4, 79)= 2.52, p=.048, η = .113. Post hoc tests (using Bonferroni corrections)
p

2

indicate that participants who received downward male percentile information were marginally
more likely to agree with the statement that they had better math ability than their male
classmates (M= 4.71, SD= .92) than participants who received female upward percentile
information (M=3.76, SD= 0.97; p=.068, d=1.00). This response is logical considering that these
participants received feedback telling them they had better ability than their male classmates,
however, we do not see similar “logical” effects for students in the other conditions.
Better than Average Effects. One potential reason that our comparison conditions
generally did not affect people’s ratings of their math abilities is that people are instead
demonstrating better than average effects. Responses to the comparative questions were
subjected to a one-sample t-test compared to the value of 4 (the midpoint of the scale).
Participants across conditions rated themselves as having better math ability than the average
woman at their university (M= 4.24, SD= 1.02, t(84)= 2.13, p=.036, d=.24), and better than the
average woman in general (M= 4.51, SD= 1.06, t(85)= 4.48, p<.001, d=.49). However,
participants did not rate their math ability differently from the average man at their university
(M= 4.04, SD= 1.02, t(83)= .32, p=.750, d=.04) or from the average man in general (M= 4.18,
SD= 1.03, t(84)= .84, p=.116, d=.18).
While most participants did not explicitly report endorsing the gender math stereotype,
these comparative judgments tell a different story; participants think they have equal ability to
most men, but better ability than most women suggesting that they do think there is a gender
difference in math ability. As such, we tested the relative math ability judgments as a moderator
for the social comparison effects, but no significant effects emerged (F<1).
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General Discussion
Across two studies, we tested how women use social comparison information from other
women and/or from men after completing a threatening math test. Overall, we did not see strong
evidence that the group membership of the comparison targets affected self-evaluations. Nor did
we see evidence that people used comparison information from ingroup versus outgroup
members differently. Instead, we saw evidence that comparing to worse-off others-- whether
they were ingroup or outgroup members-- led to more favorable self-evaluations.
Our results our inconsistent with previous research that suggests that people are likely to
assimilate to similar or ingroup comparison targets (e.g., Blanton et al., 2000; Mussweiler et al.,
2004). Additionally, our results were inconsistent with prior work that demonstrates that women
contrast from other women in stereotype threat situations when men are also present (Blanton et
al., 2002). Our studies, and our different results, could be due to a number of factors. First, across
both studies, we were relying on gender as our grouping variable. Most of the work on
intergroup comparisons described above does not examine gender, and some argue that gender is
not a distinct enough social category to indicate group membership (Blanton, 2001). As such,
future research should test this idea more specifically by comparing gender groupings to other
types of groupings (e.g., by race or ethnicity).
Second, our studies were different specifically from research examining stereotype threat
and social comparison in that we did not manipulate stereotype threat; instead, all of our
participants were in a situation designed to induce stereotype threat. In both studies, we used
threat paradigms and materials that have been successful for other researchers, but it is possible
that our participants did not experience stereotype threat as we designed. Indeed, most of our
participants did not report endorsing the stereotype that women are not as good at math as men
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(Study 2), and were less likely to believe our math task to be credible if they were outperformed
by a man (Study 1). According to Nguyen and Ryan (2008), subtle manipulations of threat work
better for the gender/math stereotype, so perhaps the present manipulation (though adapted from
other research) was too overt for this population. It is possible that gender could be a grouping
variable if it is made salient through a stereotype threat manipulation, so future research should
examine this as a potential explanation for why our results were inconsistent with previous
research.
Third, when considering how our findings compare to those of Blanton et al. (2002), it
may be relevant to consider the potential shift in gender stereotype awareness over the last 15
years. It is possible that the social context surrounding these gender stereotypes has changed
reflecting social progress. While findings from Blanton et al. (2002) suggest that when women
reject the stereotype that men are better at math, they are more likely to assimilate to other
women and thereby feel a boost of pride in their social identity, in 2018 those assimilation
effects are not so evident. However, this may reflect that women no longer use gender as a frame
of reference when making comparisons about their own abilities in various tasks. Indeed, we did
not see evidence that participants explicitly endorsed the stereotype that men are better at math
than women. However, we did still see some evidence that this stereotype is endorsed at a more
implicit level; our participants considered themselves to be better than other women at math, but
not any different in skill level than men. Indirectly, this suggests that they believe at some level
that men are more skilled at math than women. It will be important for future research to
consider how stereotypes surrounding gender and math continue to change over time.
Self-Enhancing Social Comparisons
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We did see evidence consistent with prior research that people are likely to contrast away
from their outgroup members. And, more specifically, through the use of a no-comparison
control group, we mostly saw evidence of asymmetrical contrast effects; that is, participants
were more likely to contrast away from downward comparison targets than upward targets.
People often argue that having an upward comparison as a role model is a strong intervention for
stereotype threat (e.g., Herrmann, Adelman, Bodford, Graudejus, Okun, & Kwan, 2016);
however, the present research would suggest that having downward comparisons (regardless of
gender) might actually make women feel better about their math abilities. Across both studies,
we found results that are consistent with self-enhancement. While it is not clear that our
participants were experiencing threat, there is a plethora of research suggesting that selfenhancement is a common outcome of social comparisons even in the absence of a threat; people
are particularly likely to use comparison information from downward comparison targets to selfenhance or repair self-esteem (e.g., Wills, 1981). These kinds of self-enhancing downward
comparisons can happen even with irrelevant comparison targets; Zell, Alicke, and Strickhouser
(2015) found that people evaluate themselves more favorably after comparing to a downward
comparison target even if that target is considered incompetent. Downward targets in Study 1
were scoring 64%, not a performance that would be considered “good” by participants, yet we
still see that participants rate their own abilities more favorably after comparing to the downward
targets than a baseline control.
We also see evidence of self-enhancement in the conditions in which participants
received upward comparison information. Barring one exception, participants in both studies
who received upward comparison information did not feel any worse about themselves than
participants in the no-comparison control group. This type of self-enhancement would not be
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visible without the no-comparison control group, again highlighting how important control
groups are for interpreting social comparison effects (see Bruchmann, 2017; Gerber, Wheeler, &
Suls, 2018). Yet, self-enhancing after comparing to upward targets is not uncommon. When
faced with threatening upward social comparison information, people often self-repair or selfenhance by improving future performance (Johnson, 2012), discounting the upward comparison
target (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), or disengaging
from the task (see Johnson, 2012 for a review). Additionally, in Study 2, we saw evidence of
self-enhancement through Better than Average effects; our participants indicated that they were
better at math than most women in general and at their university, and had the same level of
math skills as most men in general and at their university.
Conclusion
Across these two studies which built upon previous social comparison and stereotype
threat research, we did not see evidence for assimilation to ingroup members or a shifting of
standards driving contrast from ingroup members. Instead, we saw strong and consistent
evidence of contrast away from comparison targets regardless of group membership;
additionally, because of our control group, we saw evidence of mostly downward contrast, not
upward. In other words, comparing to worse-off others led to more favorable self-impressions
than a baseline control, whereas comparing to better-off others did not generally lead to less
favorable self-impressions. While previous research would suggest that the group membership of
the comparison targets matters for self-evaluations, our studies provide evidence that it is the
direction of the comparison targets that matters for self-evaluations.
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Figure 1. Example comparison feedback for Study 2; female-downward and male-upward
conditions.
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Table 1
Score and Comparison Feedback across Study 1 and Study 2
Study 1
Condition
Control
Female Upward
Female Downward
Male Upward
Male Downward
Female Upward,
Male Downward
Male Upward,
Female Downward

81%

98%

--

81%

81%

64%

--

81%

81%

--

98%

81%

Female
Comparison
-91st
percentile
53rd
percentile
--

81%

--

64%

81%

--

81%

98%

64%

--

--

--

81%

64%

98%

--

--

--

Self
81%

Female
Male
Comparison Comparison
---

Study 2
Self
81%

Male
Comparison
---91st percentile
53rd
percentile
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Table 2
Study 1 Means and Standard Deviations across Comparison Conditions
Performance SelfSelf-Evaluation
Comparison Condition
Esteem
Composite
Control
27.35 (3.32)
4.49 (0.76)
Female Upward
25.63 (3.51)
3.94 (0.85)
Male Upward
25.79 (4.08)
4.28 (0.84)
Female Downward
26.38 (3.37)
4.86 (0.55)
Male Downward
26.44 (3.29)
4.87 (0.63)
Female Upward, Male
Downward
24.48 (5.23)
4.41 (0.98)
Female Downward, Male
Upward
26.41 (3.81)
4.47 (0.75)

Perceptions of MA
2.90 (0.80)
2.91 (0.83)
2.16 (0.82)
3.19 (1.02)
2.58 (1.07)
2.54 (1.12)
2.80 (0.95)

RUNNING HEAD: Comparing to the ingroup versus the outgroup

Table 3
Study 2 Means and Standard Deviations across Comparison Conditions
Self-Evaluation
Comparison Condition
Performance Self-Esteem
Composite
Control
24.65 (4.78)
3.80 (1.09)
Female Upward
24.65 (4.31)
4.20 (1.01)
Male Upward
26.18 (4.20)
3.98 (1.10)
Female Downward
26.06 (5.45)
5.26 (1.32)
Male Downward
25.76 (4.55)
5.73 (.77)

